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MONETARY POLICYThe recent financial crisis did not begin in Canada, and our monetary policy regime has coped
with it well. But it has reminded us that stable inflation does not guarantee financial stability,
and made it imperative that the 2011 monetary policy agreement between the Bank of Canada
and the minister of finance should be explicit about the Bank’s responsibilities in this area.
This Commentary argues that the pursuit of price stability contributes significantly to financial
stability, and that these effects stem from the role of money and credit growth in the
mechanisms that transmit monetary policy’s effects to inflation and to asset markets. It shows
that the growth rate of a broad money aggregate (M2+), which is closely related through the
banking system’s balance sheet to the growth of bank credit, is a useful leading indicator of
inflation, and that these two variables also yield information about the emergence of financial
system fragility. 
We propose that the Bank of Canada should begin to publish a “reference value” for broad
money growth consistent with its price level goals to which actual money growth can be
compared; that deviations here should lead, not to an automatic policy reaction, but to an
examination of the forces creating them; and that a policy response should follow only if this
examination reveals the emergence of inflationary forces that other indicators have missed
and/or incipient asset market instability. 
This proposal differs from the second “monetary pillar” of the European Central Bank’s policy
framework in assigning to the reference value a cross-checking role that is clearly subordinate
to the use of more conventional analysis in the design of price stability policies. It is less
important to formally incorporate it into the 2011 monetary policy agreement than to ensure
that the Bank of Canada pays more systematic attention than it has in the recent past to money
growth, which provides important information about the longer-term prospects for both
inflation, and the development of financial market fragility.
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W
hen the Bank of Canada’s
monetary policy agreement
with the minister of finance
is renewed in 2011, it will be more
complicated than the one currently 
in place. 
The asset market turbulence that began in late
summer 2007, reached a peak at the end of 2008,
and still continues to threaten economic stability
in many parts of the world did not originate in
Canada, and the country’s monetary regime in its
current configuration has proved remarkably
robust in its face. Even so, this recent costly
reminder that price stability does not necessarily
guarantee stability elsewhere in the system likely
will ensure that the Bank’s post-2011 assignment
will give it explicit responsibilities of some sort for
asset market behaviour even as it continues 
to give pride of place to price stability goals.
A Modification of the Monetary Policy Regime 
Even though it is by now widely agreed that
dealing with asset market turbulence is primarily a
a task for regulators, questions about monetary
policy’s responsibilities here and how their exercise
might impinge on the Bank’s goals for the price
level – neatly summarized in the catchy phrase
“lean or clean?” – are still open.
1 The basic issue
here is often posed as whether the Bank should 
be prepared to deviate from the dictates of its
inflation goals to lean against signs of emerging
enthusiasm in asset markets before this develops
into dangerous and unsustainable exuberance, or
stick to those goals while always remaining ready
to tidy up any mess that unruly asset markets
might create. 
In this Commentary, we contend that policies
currently in place, aimed as they are at stable price
level behaviour, already have a good deal of asset
market “leaning” built into them. We then go on
to argue, however, that the essentially sound
configuration of these policies might be amended
to accentuate this characteristic. More specifically,
we suggest that, subject to a continuation of an
overriding commitment to a price stability goal,
the conceptual framework within which the Bank
makes its decisions should be broadened to give
an explicit, albeit subsidiary, role to the growth
rate of a broad monetary aggregate. 
As we show below, this indicator is still, as it
long has been, systematically though not tightly
correlated with price level changes over fairly long
time horizons (a year or so, roughly speaking) and
at rather low frequencies (annual averages, again
roughly speaking). Though these characteristics,
among others, render money growth unsuitable
for systematic deployment in routine policy
decisions about the overnight rate taken at six-
week intervals, they nevertheless make it a
potentially useful source of supplementary
information about longer-term inflation prospects
that can be used to cross-check the analysis used
in reaching those decisions. 
Crucially, as we also show, broad money growth
is related not only to future inflation, but also to
those build-ups in financial imbalances that, if 
not checked, ultimately can precipitate market
instability. Thus, paying systematic attention to it
not only would strengthen monetary policy’s
capacity to achieve its price level goals, but also
enhance its capacity to lean against financial
instability. And as we finally note, should there be
a switch from inflation-rate to price-level targeting
in 2011, the case for paying attention to money
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* The authors are grateful to Colin Busby, Ben Dachis, Alexandre Laurin, Angela Redish, Nicholas Rowe, Pierre Siklos, and Andrew Spence
for useful comments but remain responsible for remaining errors and omissions.
1  The phrase seems to have been coined by William White (2009) but was recently taken up by Bank of Canada governor Mark Carney
(2009). Note that, in a background document to the 2006 monetary policy agreement (Bank of Canada 2006), the Bank did suggest that 
it might be willing to extend the normal time horizon of its policy decisions regarding inflation in the face of asset market turbulence, but
the emphasis here was more on what might be needed as part of a “cleaning” operation, rather than on any pre-emptive measures that 
“leaning” might call for.growth would be strengthened further, because
implicit in such a switch would be both a
lengthening of the monetary policy horizon and a
shift of emphasis toward controlling the 
price level’s lower-frequency behaviour. 
To be more precise, we propose that, after
2011, the Bank of Canada adopt a form of the
practice already in place at the European Central
Bank – namely, the setting, at regular intervals, 
of a “reference value” for future money growth
against which this variable’s actual outcome then
could be compared. The aim would not be to
ensure that any divergence here automatically
triggered a policy change, but to prompt analysis
of the reasons for the discrepancy, in order to
assess the need for such a change. Whether a
commitment to such a practice should be formally
incorporated in the terms of the 2011 monetary
policy agreement itself, be publicly adopted by the
Bank of Canada in a background announcement
about its policy implementation processes, or
simply be put in place informally as 
a systematic underpinning for commentary to be
regularly published in the Bank’s quarterly
Monetary Policy Report is a secondary issue that 
we do not discuss here. What is important is 
that the Bank pay more systematic attention to
the behaviour of money growth in the future 
than it has in the recent past.
Inflation Targeting and Asset Markets 
Canada began inflation targeting in 1991, and
the current 2 percent target has been in place
since 1995, though there have been many
modifications to the details of monetary policy’s
conduct over the years. This regime has come
through the recent international financial crisis in
reasonably good order, but the occurrence of a
sharp local recession and a marked, albeit
temporary, fall in inflation below target in 2009
suggest that it is better adapted to the rather
tranquil times that preceded the onset of the
international financial crisis in late summer 2007
than to more turbulent conditions. That is why
modifications designed to make the regime more
robust over a wider range of economic climates
are worth considering.
The Standard Inflation-Targeting Framework 
At the heart of today’s regime lies a particular
framework for thinking about the linkages
between the inflation rate and the Bank of
Canada’s usual policy instrument, the overnight
interest rate, which is also more or less
conventional wisdom among inflation-targeting
central banks around the world. Though the
Bank’s governing council does not apply this
framework in any slavishly mechanical way, it
does routinely inform the Bank’s communications
about policy with the public at large, and
therefore presumably also helps to frame the
council’s own deliberations and decisions. This
framework, henceforth referred to as “the standard
framework,” consists of three relationships:
￿ An expectations-augmented Phillips curve: 
The inflation rate, being the aggregate result of 
a myriad individual price- (and, behind them,
wage-) setting decisions, is principally determined
by price setters’ expectations about what is likely
to happen to inflation overall, and by demand
pressures in their own particular markets, of which
the so-called output gap (the difference between
actual output and an estimate of its long-run
sustainable level) is the usually employed 
aggregate indicator.
￿ A relationship linking aggregate demand to the rate
of interest: Demand pressures vary with the
difference between the expected profitability of
expanding activity in any line of business and the
costs of borrowing to do so. Hence the aggregate
output gap varies with the difference between two
interest rates, one that measures the average
expected rate of return in the economy as a whole
and another that measures the average borrowing
rate, for which, in turn, the actual policy interest
rate set by the Bank of Canada, usually stands as 
a proxy.
￿ A Taylor rule to guide policy decisions: 
This rule instructs the Bank to raise the 
overnight rate (and by how much) when 
inflation seems likely to stray above target, 
and to lower it when it looks to be falling short,
with signals about the inflation outlook extracted
from recent and current readings on actual
inflation and the output gap.
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Monetary Policy 
Though asset market instability in the United
States and Europe clearly lay at the heart of the
recent crisis, and international financial markets
played a visible part in transmitting its effects to
Canada, asset markets play no explicit role in the
above standard framework.
2 But such markets are
integral to the mechanics of monetary policy
nevertheless, and an informal examination of 
their role is instructive. They provide not only the
links between the Bank of Canada’s policy interest
rate – the so called overnight rate – and the
interest rates at which the agents who do the
spending in the economy borrow, but also
between the latter and the rates of return on the
productive assets that those agents then buy. 
The “overnight market” is where the
commercial banks and other emitters of the
chequable deposits (with which most goods and
services ultimately are paid for) routinely borrow
from one another to cover any adverse clearing
balances that arise in the course of their day-to-
day business, and when the rate of interest ruling
in this market changes – declines, say – the costs
of covering such shortfalls also goes down. The
likelihood of any individual institution’s having to
indulge in overnight borrowing from its peers, or
even in extreme circumstances from the Bank of
Canada itself, rises with the volume of the loans it
makes. It follows that, when the Bank makes such
borrowing cheaper, (and crucially, if other things
remain equal), each individual institution, and
hence the banking system as a whole is likely to
ease the terms on which it offers credit to its
customers in order to encourage them to increase
the volume of their own borrowing. 
This effect begins a process in whose subsequent
rounds asset markets also play a prominent role.
Though details vary from instance to instance,
these rounds see borrowers spending their newly
acquired funds not only directly on newly
produced goods and services, but also on other
financial assets – stocks, bonds, commercial paper,
and the like – some of whose sellers in turn
become buyers of new newly produced goods 
and services; and so on. 
The two crucial features of the process just
described are, first, that when banks make new
loans, they do so by writing up new deposits 
on the liability side of their balance sheets; and,
second, that these do not disappear when the
borrowers to whose accounts they are first credited
spend them, but pass into the hands of the sellers,
making them in turn more willing to spend. This
sequence will come to an end only when the
economy’s level of overall activity, not to mention
the level of prices ruling in it, have increased
sufficiently to make agents willing holders of those
newly created deposits.
3
The foregoing example began with the central
bank’s taking action to reduce the overnight rate,
but a monetary policy change is not the only
event that can set in motion the linkages between
the overnight market and the behaviour of output
and prices. As we noted, certain “other things”
were held equal to keep the exposition
manageable, including those many factors
impinging directly on the rest of the economy that
influence the public’s desire to vary the volume of
its spending and, therefore, their borrowing from
the banking system, even when the terms offered
by the latter do not change. 
Shocks are constantly occurring that affect
firms’ expectations about the profitability of 
using newly borrowed funds to acquire plant,
equipment, and other producer durable goods,
inventories of goods in various stages of
production, and so on. Similarly, there are shocks
to households’ perceptions of the desirability of
acquiring consumer durable goods – including, in
Commentary 312 | 3
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2  See Woodford (2003) for the canonical academic account of this framework.
3  One possible channel of adjustment here, of course, would be the elimination of newly created money if its holders used it to purchase non-
monetary liabilities from the banking system. Clearly, such behaviour can influence broad money less than narrow money. And if the holders
in question used their newly acquired money to pay off some of their bank debt, this would tend to push bank lending below the level
desired by those institutions and hence give them incentives to make new loans, which, of course, would involve the creation of new deposits
to replace those just eliminated.particular, as recent experience shows, housing.
When firms and households become more
optimistic about the returns to be had from
acquiring non-financial assets such as these for any
reason – whether well justified or 
not by hard facts is irrelevant – then an expansion
of credit and money will be set in motion from
the borrowing side of the market. And if the
central bank does not then respond by increasing
the overnight rate, the banking system in
particular, and financial markets in general, will
accommodate it, with consequences for output
and inflation that will be essentially the same as
those of a cut in the overnight rate under
conditions of stable expectations. 
The third component of the standard
framework, the Taylor rule, summarizes the 
policy implications of all this, and its basis may 
be restated in the following familiar terms. First,
at any moment, and based on the general state of
optimism or pessimism among firms and
households, there exists a “neutral” value for the
overnight rate of interest at which monetary
policy imparts neither upward nor downward
pressure on the inflation rate. Second, deviations
of the overnight rate from this value can occur
either because of policy actions or because of any
number of disturbances arising elsewhere in the
economy that can impinge on the expectations of
potential borrowers. Third, the policymaker’s goal
must be to avoid such deviations.  
The Dangers of Ignoring Asset Markets
The standard framework thus focuses on two
interest rates, the policy rate and the expected 
rate of return underlying the public’s expenditure
decisions. But the mechanisms through which
these interact with one another and influence the
economy’s demand for output operate through
markets in which stocks of assets, both financial
and real, are traded. The standard framework
suppresses these links in order to achieve analytic
simplicity, and if these asset markets are
functioning smoothly, this does no harm. Careful
monitoring of the relationships among the
overnight rate, output, and inflation suffices to
keep monetary policy on track. So long as benign
circumstances prevail, the standard framework
can, and apparently does, serve as an adequate
guide to stabilizing the inflation rate. Canada’s
economic performance under close to two decades
of inflation targeting is testimony to this fact. 
That same framework begins to lose touch with
reality, however, the moment asset markets cease
to function smoothly. This is what began to
happen, even in Canada, in late 2007, and why
the conduct of monetary policy here as elsewhere
soon had to resort to what were called, by no
accident, “non-standard” instruments as, among
other things, mechanical applications of Taylor
rules began to call for a negative overnight rate. 
In the nature of things, of course, this was
impossible, so other means had to be found to
bring about the expansions of bank credit and
deposits that are always central to the application
of monetary stimulus to the economy. 
It is not only when asset markets are disrupted,
however, that the standard framework is a
treacherous guide to policy. Less obviously, but
surely more seriously, it can be potentially
unreliable even when these markets seem to be
functioning well, for the simple reason that,
taking as it does such a state of affairs for granted,
the framework can provide no warning signs when
markets are in danger of going off the rails.
Policymakers who rely too exclusively on the
standard framework to guide their thinking,
therefore, not only find themselves improvising
when tranquil times in asset markets come to an
end; they are also inevitably taken by surprise by
the arrival of such turbulence. 
A basic problem here, as the recent crisis
painfully reminded us, is that the absence of any
obvious trouble on the inflation front does not
guarantee stability in asset markets, where
unsustainable imbalances can slowly build up over
time even if the price level seems to be behaving
well. The recent crisis also reminded us that, when
corrections that interrupt the normal working of
| 4 Commentary 312
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asset markets occur, these can also precipitate
instability in the wider economy, which is what
happened from late summer 2007 onward. At
such times, the real economy can experience
significant damage, while the central bank’s ability
to hit its inflation targets and its capacity to
organize an orderly clean-up of the asset markets
where the trouble began can also be impaired.    
In short, it is always dangerous for policymakers
to ignore the crucial role played by asset markets
in linking the behaviour of the economy to their
actions, and an inflation-targeting regime built
around the “standard framework” is, therefore,
inadequate. The remedy is not to abandon the
goal embedded in that regime, however, but to
modify the means of designing policies to achieve
it so as to eliminate dangerous oversimplifications.
That is why, as we now argue in some detail, it
would be a great help if the behaviour of such key
financial assets as money and bank credit was
brought systematically into the policy picture. 
Monetary Aggregates and 
Monetary Policy 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, monetary
aggregates of one sort or another were at centre
stage in monetary policy in a number of countries,
Canada included, and everywhere delivered less
than had been hoped of them. In most places,
again Canada included, their formal use was given
up altogether. Germany and Switzerland, however,
rather than abandon the monetary aggregates,
modified the way they were used, and it is perhaps
not entirely accidental that these two economies
performed somewhat better than their peers on
the inflation front in subsequent years, or that the
German modification has persisted down to the
present in the form of the “monetary pillar” of the
European Central Bank’s “two pillar” approach to
policymaking, which we shall discuss below. 
Money Growth and Inflation in Canada 
In the past two or three years, on the other
hand, the Bank of Canada for a while almost lost
even an informal interest in the behaviour of
monetary aggregates.
4 Consider, for example, their
recent, albeit not quite complete, disappearance
from the Bank’s Monetary Policy Report – the
quarterly publication that provides a detailed
summary of the Bank’s current policies and
strategies as well as analysis of current economic
conditions. Prior to April 2008, the Report
routinely contained analysis of the behaviour of
both narrow and broad money aggregates,
accompanied by charts. It also usually discussed
the implications of this behaviour for near-term
economic conditions and inflationary
developments, though this discussion was
becoming less thorough even before the charts’
disappearance in April 2008. Brief verbal
references to monetary aggregates began to
reappear in the April 2009 Report, but their
treatment is cursory and even inconsistent.
Sometimes, rapid money growth is interpreted as
reflecting a rising private-sector demand for
liquidity and, more recently, as perhaps heralding
a potential increase in private-sector expenditure,
without any explanation of these changing
interpretations being offered.  
This decline in the Bank’s apparent interest in
monetary aggregates occurred even though the
generalizations about their relationships to
inflation and output that David Longworth
(2003) – and before him a number of other Bank
researchers – had identified continued to hold
true. In particular, broad money growth has
usually continued to lead the inflation rate by
4  But in the last few months, there seems to have been a revival of interest here. See, for example, Macklem (2010).| 6 Commentary 312
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about a year – perhaps a little less – just as it
always did. This relationship is shown in Figure 1,
using a slightly modified version of the Bank’s
M2+ variable to measure broad money.
5
Nevertheless, a cursory look at Figure 1 also
shows that this relationship seems to have broken
down temporarily on a number of occasions, not
least over the past 18 months or so – so the
evidence presented here stops far short of any kind
of case for putting money growth at the centre of
any policy regime.
As to transactions-related narrow money,
represented here by the Bank of Canada’s M1+
variable, this aggregate’s growth rate has long been
known to have leading indicator properties of its
own over real output’s behaviour. If, as the Phillips
curve embodied in the standard framework would
have it, the latter variable influences inflation
through the output gap, then variations in narrow
money growth also must foreshadow variations in
inflation, though the latter relationship has often
been, and remains, hard to display in simple 
two-variable time-series diagrams. Note, however,
that M1+ is a component of M2+ (and of all other
broader aggregates, too). Its growth rate often
moves in harmony with that of M2+ (see Figure
5  See Appendix A for a description of this variable and an explanation of why we chose it. We gratefully acknowledge several helpful
















Consumer Price Index (Left Axis) Modified M2+(Right Axis)
Figure 1: Year-over-Year Growth Rate of Modified M2+ and the Consumer Price Index, 1977\Q1 - 2010\Q1
Source: Statistics Canada.2), but when it does not, this necessarily implies
that the composition of M2+ is changing.
Specifically, when narrow money is growing faster
(slower) than broad, then the proportion of the
latter that is made up of assets immediately
available for use in market transactions is also
growing (shrinking), and any specific quantity of a
broad aggregate is therefore becoming more (less)
liquid.
6 Figure 3 reproduces the data displayed in
Figure 1, but also displays the growth rate of a
variable, which we label “liquidity,” represented by
the proportion of M2+ made up of M1+. As the
reader will see, episodes in which the time path 
of inflation diverges markedly from that of M2+
growth seem to be preceded by variations in this
ratio’s growth rate.
Now, time series charts can never do more than
illustrate relationships, and sometimes they can 
be downright misleading. So, in Appendix A, 
we present the results of a more formal
econometric analysis of the relationships 
between the growth rates of M2+ and inflation.
The model  we discuss there confirms the
relatively strong leading statistical relationship
between broad money and inflation. It also
presents evidence that all variables of the model –
M2+, inflation, the overnight rate, nominal gross
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6  A more formal approach to measuring monetary aggregates – associated in particular with the work of William Barnett (1980) – that pays 
explicit attention to the varying degrees of liquidity embodied in their components uses so-called Divisia quantity indices to measure them. This
approach, which has much sound microeconomic theory to back it up, nevertheless has turned out to be difficult to apply in practice, not least in















M1+(Left Axis) Modified M2+(Right Axis)
Figure 2: Year-over-Year Growth Rate of M1+ and Modified M2+, 1977\Q1 - 2010\Q1
Source: Statistics Canada. | 8 Commentary 312
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domestic product (GDP) – are useful predictors 
of the others.
7
The evidence we have been discussing here
supports our earlier argument that policy
variations in the overnight rate and their ultimate
impact on inflation are indeed linked by
mechanisms that run through the financial system
and in which the growth rates of monetary
aggregates play a strategic role. Even so, these
linkages evidently are rather loose and occasionally
unreliable, even in annual average data. It thus
would be hard to claim on the basis of our results
that the past performance of Canadian monetary
policy in hitting its inflation targets would have
been systematically improved had policymakers
taken explicit notice of them, or that the future
use of money growth data as central inputs into
routine policy decisions aimed at controlling
inflation made at roughly six-week intervals would
be appropriate. Apart from anything else, the
construction of data on monetary aggregates takes
months, rather than weeks, and first estimates are
7  To express matters more formally, they Granger cause the other variables. A variable is said to Granger cause another variable when it











Modified M2+ Consumer Price Index  Liquidity 
Figure 3: Year-over-Year Growth Rate of Modified M2+, the Consumer Price Index, and Liquidity, 
1977\Q1 - 2010\Q1
Note: Liquidity is defined as the ratio of M1+ to modified M2+.
Source: Statistics Canada.often subject to revision as well, so the relevant
series lack both the timeliness and the accuracy
that such a decision schedule requires.
8 As far as
the control of inflation is concerned, then, as we
noted at the outset, money growth data are best
deployed to keep an eye on longer-horizon and
lower-frequency aspects of the inflation outlook. 
It is when questions about the relevance of asset
market instability for the conduct of monetary
policy are posed that their behaviour takes on
more significance. 
Money Growth and the “leaning” Properties of
Inflation Targeting 
Canadian asset markets were not quite immune 
to locally created problems in the run-up to the
international financial crisis that began in 2007.
For example, the 2005-07 period saw a
(mercifully) short-lived relaxation of mortgage
lending standards in Canada that, with benefit of
hindsight, had the potential to destabilize sectors
of the housing market, and the local market for
asset-backed commercial paper did collapse in
September 2007. Once the crisis broke out in
earnest, moreover, Canadian housing and stock
Commentary 312 | 9
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8  Freedman (2010) gives a thorough account of the Bank of Canada's efforts to integrate the behaviour of monetary aggregates into its








- Modified M2+ Total Credit From Deposit-Taking Institutions
Figure 4: Year-over-Year Growth Rate of Modified M2+ and Total Credit from Deposit-taking 
Institutions, 1977\Q1 - 2010\Q1
Source: Statistics Canada.markets suffered significant setbacks, albeit less
pronounced and of shorter duration than those in
many other industrialized countries. 
In short, asset market instability has recently
presented problems in Canada, even if these have
been an order of magnitude less severe than those
encountered in many other places, so the results of
a growing number of studies of the recent record
and of a wide range of earlier episodes that have
searched for clues about the causes of asset market
instability have considerable current local
relevance, even if they largely draw on data from
other times and places.
9 The main findings that
emerge from these studies are striking. It seems
that episodes of serious asset market instability are
associated almost universally with prior surges in
the rates of growth of bank credit and broad
money.
10 To the extent that it is possible to
distinguish between the effects of these two
variables, the bulk of the evidence indicates that
credit growth seems to be the immediate culprit in
driving asset markets off track, but since each of
them constitutes a significant fraction of opposite
sides of the same balance sheet, it is hard to
imagine an acceleration in credit growth strong
enough to disturb asset markets that is not also
accompanied by a surge of broad money growth.













Periods of Financial Stress (IMF Financial Stress Index)            Modified M2 + Growth
Figure 5: Year-over-Year Growth Rate of Modified M2+ and Periods of Financial Stress in Canada 
(IMF Financial Stress Index), 1980\Q4 - 2008\Q3
Source: Statistics Canada, and International Monetary Fund.
9  It is also worth noting that some of this work, notably that originating at the Bank for International Settlements, began well before 
the onset of the recent crisis.
10 For recent surveys of this evidence, see Gerdesmeier, Reimers, and Roffia (2009).Figure 4 confirms this impression for the
Canadian case, showing how closely M2+ has
moved with total credit granted by deposit-taking
institutions - our specific measure of what we 
here call “bank credit” or sometimes just “credit” –
while Figures 5 and 6 show that surges in money
and credit growth have in the past regularly
foreshadowed episodes of financial market
fragility, if not outright instability. Appendix B
provides more formal evidence that periods of
financial stress are preceded, in almost all
instances, by periods of high money and credit
growth. Unlike in most other countries studied,
however, in Canada money performs as well 
as – or even, in some respect, better than –
credit as a leading indicator of financial stress 
(see Appendix B for more details). The differences
here are, however, very small, and this is surely not
surprising, because, as we explained earlier, the 
key role of financial markets in monetary policy’s
transmission mechanism implies that rather low
growth rates of both bank credit and broad money
usually should accompany successful inflation
targeting – among other reasons, because they are
significant components of the opposite sides of
the same balance sheet.
This does not quite imply, however, that
successful inflation-targeting policies, which
would integrate monetary considerations
adequately, could be relied on always to give
Commentary 312 | 11
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Figure 6: Year-over-Year Growth Rate of Total Credit from Deposit-Taking Institutions and 
Periods of Financial Stress in Canada (IMF Financial Stress Index), 1980\Q4 - 2008\Q3 
Source: Statistics Canada, and International Monetary Fund.  | 12 Commentary 312
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complete protection against asset market
instability. The overoptimistic profit expectations
and excessive lending that lie at the heart of the
latter are usually, by their very nature, sectoral in
nature rather than economy-wide, at least as they
first develop. Furthermore, the economy’s capacity
to absorb broad money itself expands over time as
the economy grows, and that capacity is also
sometimes subject to variations associated with
institutional developments within the financial
system that are easier to explain in hindsight than
to understand when they are occurring. Thus,
excessive credit can be granted to a particular
sector and produce an unsustainable boom within
it, without also setting in motion an economy-
wide rate of broad money growth sufficiently
rapid to exert significant upward pressure on the
overall inflation rate. Though asset market crises
are usually preceded by credit and money growth
sufficient to influence the inflation rate as well,
therefore – and hence can often be forestalled as a
side effect of policies aimed solely at keeping
inflation in check – they can still sometimes occur
even when inflation itself seems to be under
control. This is why the routine monitoring of
broad money growth as a prelude to investigating
any unusual behaviour on its part adds an extra,
though still not foolproof, safeguard to a
monetary policy regime whose central aim is the
control of inflation. Recent experience in the euro
zone, described briefly in Box 1, illustrates how
such monitoring can work, but also provides a
cautionary lesson about how its effectiveness
ultimately depends on how vigorously policymakers
respond to the problems it uncovers.
A Place for Broad Money in Canada’s Policy
Framework 
As we noted at the outset of this Commentary,
the maintenance of asset market stability has
acquired a much higher degree of policy
significance in Canada since 2007, to the point at
which it will require explicit attention in the 2011
policy agreement between the Bank of Canada
and the minister of finance if that agreement is to
have political credibility. But as we also noted, it
nevertheless remains a fact that inflation targeting
has now enjoyed almost two decades of success, so
this same agreement must make the continuation
and consolidation of that success its first priority. 
A Reference Value for Money Growth
These two requirements could be met
simultaneously by an agreement that continued 
to make a formal target for price level behaviour
monetary policy’s only goal, but also explicitly
recognized that leaning against asset market
instability is an inherent feature of such a regime
and exploited this fact. This could be achieved
either by explicitly mandating the Bank of Canada
regularly to set a subsidiary “reference value” as a
basis for monitoring broad money or credit
growth, or more simply by including a suitable
phrased reference to the importance of financial
stability in the agreement itself and leaving it to
the Bank to implement this obligation by
adopting such an approach in some more or less
formal manner of its own choosing. 
As we saw in Figures 5 and 6, and as Appendix
B shows, both excessive growth in broad money
and bank credit are closely related to build-ups in
financial imbalances and, more specifically, to
ensuing periods of financial stress in Canada.
11
Either variable, therefore, would be a suitable
candidate for regular monitoring if the only aim
was to detect the emergence of such problems.
Because, however, we envisage the pursuit of price
stability remaining the primary object of
monetary policy after 2011, the reinforcement of
the Bank’s effectiveness in achieving this goal
would have to be decisive in this choice, and
because broad money is more closely related than
bank credit to the longer-run, low-frequency
behaviour of the price level, it emerges as the 
11  The financial literature does not provide a precise definition of financial stress, but such episodes are often characterized as periods of
banking sector difficulties and of important repricing of risks and reduced liquidity in financial markets. For the purposes of this
Commentary, we use the Financial Stress Index developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is a composite index of
banking, securities market, and foreign exchange variables; for more information, see Appendix B.Commentary 312 | 13
better alternative. Nevertheless, and crucially, the
routine use of information about its growth rate to
help pick up the emergence of longer-run
economy-wide inflationary pressures that other
variables might sometimes miss also would help
the Bank to keep track of factors systematically
related to the emergence of financial imbalances –
a considerable bonus from its deployment.         
A Specific Proposal 
To be specific, then, we suggest that Canada’s
2011 monetary policy agreement continue to
direct the Bank of Canada single-mindedly to
pursue a price stability goal. But we also suggest
that the Bank also commit, either as part of that
agreement or in some less formal way, to publish
at regular intervals – for example in its quarterly
Monetary Policy Report – a projected growth rate
for broad money (a “reference value” for this
variable) that seems consistent with its desired
outcome for the price level over its usual 
18-month horizon, and also to monitor actual
broad money growth in the light of that
projection. This reference value would not be a
money growth target in any usual sense of this
phrase, because the Bank would not be required 
to change its policy stance if and when actual 
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
In the run-up to the financial crisis that came to a
head in 2007, credit-fed local booms developed in
the housing markets of Spain and Ireland that
were not matched in other, much larger
segments of the euro zone. These were not
associated with any discernable effect on the
overall inflation rate in the zone as a whole, and
hence gave no immediate cause for any policy
response on the part of the European Central
Bank (ECB). As we now know, however, they 
did have potentially serious system-wide effects
when they collapsed. Nonetheless, double-digit
money and credit growth, which underpinned
these growing imbalances in euro zone asset
markets, did provoke a response, albeit with
hindsight insufficiently vigorous, on the part of
the ECB. 
This happened as a consequence of the ECB’s
“two-pillar” approach to policymaking, which
works as follows. In support of its policy
decisions, the ECB organizes, evaluates, and 
cross-checks information relevant for price
stability according to two analytical
perspectives, or “pillars,” one “economic” and
the other “monetary.” The ECB’s economic
analysis, broadly speaking, is underpinned by the
same three-relationship standard conceptual
framework that we discuss in some detail, but
supplemented by monetary analysis that -
drawing on the long-run relationship between
broad money and prices - is used to cross-check,
from a medium- to long-term perspective, the
short- to medium-term implications for monetary
policy that the economic analysis yields.* 
According to the ECB itself, this monetary cross-
check was decisive in its decision to keep its
policy rate at 2 percent in summer 2004 instead of
reducing it further, as “economic” analysis based
on the standard framework was prompting, and 
to start raising it in late 2005 (Trichet 2009).
Though these policy measures were not enough 
to prevent the development of sectoral
imbalances in Spain and Ireland or to forestall
the later asset market disruptions that their
unwinding created, they arguably helped to
reduce their scope and severity and that of their
subsequent repercussions as well.
In short, the ECB’s experience with its “monetary
pillar” suggests that it is sometimes possible to
identify the emergence of economy-wide
financial imbalances through the analysis of a
wider range of economic variables than those
embodied in the standard framework, most
notably credit and monetary variables, and that
such analysis can help to enhance the
effectiveness of what we call the “leaning”
properties of inflation targeting.
Box 1: A Recent European Example
* For an outline of the ECB's monetary policy strategy, see http://www.ecb.de/mopo/strategy/html/index.en.html.| 14 Commentary 312
money growth deviated from it. Rather, it 
would provide the basis for a continuous process
of cross-checking against money growth data
other information about the inflation outlook
coming from the more conventional set of
variables that, processed as now through a version
of the standard framework, would continue to
play a central role in guiding policy. 
In all likelihood, such cross-checking usually
would confirm policy decisions reached on a more
conventional basis, but when it did not, further
analysis would be called for. For example, if
money began to grow at a rate faster than the
reference value that seemed consistent with the
Bank’s inflation target, it would be necessary to
ask whether this reflected incipient inflationary
pressures that other variables had not yet detected
and/or growing financial imbalances that
ultimately might have implications for inflation,
or whether it was the result of some other
developments within financial markets that were
of no policy significance. What would then be
done would depend on the answers yielded by 
this further analysis. 
If the Bank’s reference value for money growth
were made public at regular intervals, private
agents also would be able to monitor this variable’s
performance both relative to the Bank’s
expectations and to their own. Such routine
announcements would ensure that all concerned
would pay systematic and careful attention to
developments in the financial system. At the very
least, this would do nothing to weaken the Bank’s
ability to achieve its price level goals and it could
well enhance it, because, though almost two
decades of experience with successful inflation
targeting have already done a great deal for the
Bank’s transparency and credibility, extra help on
this front is always welcome – and the addition of








Figure 7: Inflation Expectations in Canada Embedded in the Difference between Long-term Federal
Government Bonds and Real Return Bonds, 2000\Q1 - 2010\Q2
Source: Bank of Canada.  Commentary 312 | 15
would provide such help. As is apparent from
Figure 7, which depicts the time path of the
longer-run inflation expectations implicit in the
real return-conventional bond yield spread, it is
still possible for these expectations, and hence the
Bank’s credibility, to be buffeted by economic
turbulence.
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The fact that broad money growth’s relationship
to inflation is stronger at low frequencies – a key
factor that makes it an unhelpful guide for day to
day policy decisions – surely makes it particularly
suitable for helping to anchor inflation
expectations, while also ensuring that any early
warnings of asset market instability emerging from
its behaviour would receive serious analysis. The
exploitation of these characteristics by giving an
explicit though subsidiary role to broad money
thus would enhance the already existing ability of
a policy regime aimed at price level behaviour to
lean against such eventualities. 
A Reference Value under Price-Level Targeting 
A price stability goal can be expressed either as an
inflation target or a price-level target. The choice
between these as the centrepiece of Canada’s post-
2011 monetary policy regime is beyond the scope
of this Commentary, but it is worth noting that
price-level targeting requires more sophistication
on the part of the public in forming expectations
than does inflation targeting. In particular, under
price-level targeting, agents need to distinguish
between policymakers’ goals for inflation over
longer time horizons, defined by their chosen 
rate of increase for the price level, and shorter
horizons, defined by the rate of inflation needed
for the price level to catch up (or move down) to
its chosen path after a deviation from it. And
agents also have to form estimates of the
likelihood of policy’s success on both fronts. 
Extra inputs into the formation of expectations
about the longer-term behaviour of the price level
would be particularly useful under such a regime,
and a reference value for broad money growth,
most of whose information content concerns the
low-frequency behaviour of prices at a rather long
horizon, would be particularly well adapted to
this task.    
Summary and Conclusions 
In this Commentary, we began from the
position that Canada’s post-2011 monetary policy
regime should continue to treat some measure of
price stability as its only goal. Almost two decades
of experience with inflation targeting have shown
this to be both feasible and supportive of good
economic performance overall, and the experience
in question has established a high degree of
credibility for the regime as well. There is no need,
therefore, to make basic changes to what is already
working rather well. However, the events of the
past two or three years also make it advisable for
monetary policy to pay attention to the
maintenance of asset market stability, and our
foregoing analysis largely was devoted to
reconciling this need with the continued pursuit
of price level goals.  
We showed, first, that once the role of asset
markets in the mechanics of inflation (or price-
level) targeting is made explicit, such a policy
turns out to do a great deal to promote orderly
asset market behaviour – a conclusion that hinges,
in particular, on the role broader money and
credit aggregates play in the transmission
mechanism that links monetary policy to the
behaviour of the rest of the economy. On the basis
of this analysis, we then suggested that the Bank
of Canada begin to deploy an explicit “reference
value” for the rate of growth of a broad monetary
aggregate as it implements policy. Such a value
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
12  We recognize that this variable provides an imperfect measure of inflation expectations, because of the special features of the market for index-
linked securities. However, these imperfections have more to do with the estimates the variable provides of the overall level of the expected
inflation rate than of changes in that level. Other measures of inflation expectations published by the Bank of Canada among its Monetary
Policy Indicators showed similar volatility in 2008 and 2009; see online at http://bankofcanada.ca/en/rates/indinf.html. For example, the
proportion of firms expecting consumer price index inflation to fall below 1 percent per annum over the next year rose from 1 percent in the
third quarter of 2008 to 30 percent in the fourth quarter, and to 41 percent in the first quarter of 2009, before beginning to recover. Over the
same period, the proportion of firms expecting the prices of their own products to rise by 1 percent or less rose from 24 percent to 72 percent.
Only the consensus forecast of inflation at a two-year horizon remained firmly anchored in the vicinity of 2 percent during this period.would not be a target, deviations from which
would call for a policy response. Rather, it would
resemble more a forecast of the money growth rate
that seems to be compatible with achieving the
Bank’s goals for the price level, and deviations
from it in the first instance would prompt further
evaluation of other inputs into policy formation,
not least those originating in asset markets. Policy
action would be called for only if the results of
that evaluation supported it. 
Such a measure could be adopted either
formally, as part of a new monetary policy
agreement, or informally, as a modification more
or less explicit according to the Bank’s tastes to
that institution’s operating procedures, and we
take no position on these matters. What is
important is that its adoption would add an extra
and visible layer of security to those procedures,
ensuring that a key economic variable whose
behaviour is known to be associated systematically
with future outcomes for both the price level and
the stability of asset markets is constantly
monitored both by those implementing policy
and those of us in the rest of the economy whose
decisions are dependent on monetary policy’s
continued success.
| 16 Commentary 312
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Appendix A 
This appendix presents the main results from the
econometric analysis we performed, which supports
some of the evidence presented in the main text.
First, we estimated a small vector autoregression
(VAR), with 8 lags, using quarterly data from 1993
to 2009 for four variables: the logarithm of modified
M2+, the logarithm of the total consumer price
index (CPI) , the logarithm of nominal 
GDP, and the average of the overnight rate. 
M2+, inflation and GDP are seasonally 
adjusted and in first difference. 
Our measure of broad money is a slightly
modified version of the Bank of Canada M2+
variable, which includes currency outside banks
plus bank personal deposits, (including term
deposits), and bank non-personal demand and
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
 Equation        Excluded   chi
2  Degree of Freedom  Prob > chi
2 
Modified M2+  CPI  31.419  8  0.000 
Modified M2+  Overnight rate  80.694  8  0.000 
Modified M2+  Nominal GDP  27.691  8  0.001 
Modified M2+  All  163.68  24  0.000 
CPI Modified  M2+  21.81  8 0.005 
CPI Overnight  rate  13.722  8 0.089 
CPI Overnight  rate  23.886  8 0.002 
CPI All  66.28 24 0.000 
Overnight rate  Modified M2+  19.449  8  0.013 
Overnight rate  CPI  41.979  8  0.000 
Overnight rate  Nominal GDP  56.968  8  0.000 
Overnight rate  All  146.72  24  0.000 
Nominal GDP  Modified M2+  39.844  8  0.000 
Nominal GDP  CPI  34.013  8  0.000 
Nominal GDP  Overnight rate  23.569  8  0.003 
Nominal GDP  All  121.34  24  0.000 
 





95% CI                               Impulse response function (irf)
step
Figure A-1: Impulse Response Function of a One Unit Increase of Modified M2+ on Inflation
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  | 18 Commentary 312
notice (but not term) deposits, less interbank
deposits plus continuity adjustments. It also
includes all deposits at trust and mortgage loan
companies and government savings institutions, 
all deposits and shares at credit unions and 
caisses populaires, including both personal and 
non-personal term deposits, and life insurance
company individual annuities. 
Our modified measure, in contrast, treats 
deposits at chartered banks and other institutions
symmetrically because we add to the Bank’s variable
non-personal term deposits at chartered banks. Such
deposits are included in the data for other types 
of institutions such as trusts and loans companies,
and simple consistency suggests that those held at
chartered banks should be included as well.
Furthermore, it seems to us odd to include or
exclude a particular class of deposits from a measure
of the money supply on the basis of who is holding
it. We thus believe that our modified M2+ variable
provides a potentially more useful indicator of broad
money growth as it relates both to the build-up of
inflationary pressures and financial instabilities in
the Canadian economy than does the Bank’s own
measure. We also considered using the Bank’s two
broader monetary aggregates, M2++ and M3, 
but rejected them, the first because one of its
components is the cumulated net inflow of funds
into all mutual funds, a variable whose relationship
to any reasonable definition of money seems to us to
be tenuous, and the latter because it includes foreign
currency deposits held at Canadian institutions,
assets that might well be close substitutes for
Canadian money in their holders’ portfolios but that
clearly are not themselves Canadian money.
Table A-1 presents some of the important results
from our VAR model – specifically, evidence that all
the variables in the model usefully predict values of
the other variables in the model or, in statistical
terms, Granger cause them. In particular, the table
confirms a statistical relationship between broad
money and subsequent inflation. Figure A-1
elaborates on this relationship by presenting the
impulse response function – that is, the effect of one
unit increase of a variable on another over time – of 
a one unit increase in modified M2+ growth on
inflation four quarters ahead. The response function
suggests that the impact of M2+ on inflation is
highest about three quarters into the future.
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Appendix B 
We also performed some simple statistical analysis
on the relationship between monetary variables and
periods of financial stress in Canada. More
specifically, we used a probit model to evaluate the
usefulness of our modified M2+ variable, a credit
from deposit-taking institutions variable, and a total
credit variable to predict periods of financial stress as
calculated by the International Monetary Fund Stress
Test Index.
13The period analyzed is from 1980:Q4
to 2008:Q3, during which a total of 21 quarters are
characterized as episodes of financial stress. The
results of our regressions are shown in Table B-1.
The three variables are all very significant
predictors of periods of financial stress in Canada,
with the McFadden R2 indicating a very slightly
better model fit for total credit. The model based on
modified M2+, however, classifies correctly each
quarter (stress versus non-stress) more often than
other variables – that is, it gives less false alarms and
misses fewer periods of stress. This result is
dependent on the threshold used to define stress –
that is, the probability over which one considers the
model’s predicted probability of the occurrence of a
period of stress to indicate that such a period will occur.
Following Gerdesmeier, Reimers, and Roffia (2009), we
use a threshold of 35 percent, with which the model
based on modified M2+ correctly classifies the following
quarter 86 percent of the time. Table B-2 presents the
results. The model correctly predicts 13 of the 21
episodes of financial stress one quarter ahead. Perhaps
more impressive is the fact that each of the 20 times 
the model predicts a stress for a given quarter, there has
always been actual stress in either that quarter or in at
least one of the following four quarters.
Of course, it would be a lot to ask of a single
indicator to predict all periods of financial stress under
all circumstances. In particular, some periods of
financial stress in Canada might find their origins
entirely in foreign phenomena, in which cases
Canadian-only indicators, including our modified
M2+, would not be very useful in predicting them. This
is not a bad characteristic, however, for an indicator to
be used as a reference value for Canadian policymakers.
The Bank of Canada should not be in the business of
curbing growing economic imbalances in the rest of the
world economy. This is clearly a case where the Bank
would be better off “cleaning” any negative
consequences of financial instability originating
elsewhere than trying to prevent its occurrence 
in the first place. 
C.D. Howe Institute
13  The index is composed of various market-based indicators, such as the TED spread. An episode of financial stress is identified as a period
when the index for a country is more than one standard deviation above its trend.
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient  p-value  McFadden’s R
2 Correctly  Classifies
* 
Modified M2+   18.369   0.000  0.192   86.5%  
Credit from deposit taking  13.326   0.000  0.184   80.2%  
Total credit  19.318   0.000  0.197   79.3%  
 
Table B-1: Regression Results: Money, Credit, and Periods of Financial Stress
* Threshold of 35 percent. 
Note: Explanatory variables are quarterly year-over-year rates of change, lagged one quarter.
  Crisis Occurs 
(next quarter) 
Crisis Does Not Occur 
(next quarter) 
Predicts a crisis  13  7 
Does not predict a crisis  8  83 
 
Table B-2: Performance of Modified M2+ as a Leading Indicator of Financial Stress
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Statistics Canada.Commentary 312 | 20
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